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At an IAS Tenn, Pait 13 of the Supreme Court of
the State of New York, held in and for the
County of Kings, at the Courthouse, at Civic
Center, Brooklyn, New York, on the 12111 day of
March, 2007.
P RE S EN T:
HON. MARK I. PARTNOW,
Justice.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
lN THE MA TIER OF THE APPl,:ICATION OF
IVAN Rios,

Petitioner,
For a Judgment Pursuant to Aiticle 78
of the Civil Procedure Law and Rules

Index No. 31731106

- agamst -

NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,

Respondent.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
The fol lowing ptipers numbered I to 3 read on this motion:

Papers Numhcrcu
Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause/
Petition/Cross Motion and
Affidavits (Affirmations) Annexed,____ __ _ __ __
Opposing Affidavits (Affirm ations)._ __ _ __ _ __
Reply Affidavits (Affinnations)_ _ _ _ __ __ __
_ _ _ __ Affidavit (Affirmation)_ _ _ __ _ _ _
Other Papers documents subm itted by respondent
.
.
m camera review
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Upon the foregoing papers, petitioner Ivan Rios moves for a Judgment pursuant to
CPLR article 78, reversing and vacating the May 8, 2006 determination of respondent New
York State Division of P;irolr (Parole Board) withholding petitioner's release to parole
superv ision, and directing the Parole Board to grant petitioner another parole hearing to
reconsider whether petitioner should be released to parole supervision.
On August 16, 1986, petitioner, then 19 years of age and armed with a .22 caliber
revolver, and five others wcnc to a planned location for a confrontation with another group
of people. There, one of the members of the iival group charged petitioner and one of his
companions; in response, petitionerpointcd the gun in front of himself, fired two shots and
then fled. Two men were fatally wounded by petitioner's shots and petitioner was later
charged, under Kings County lndiclrnenl Number 6089/86, with two counts of murder in the
second degree. After pleading guilty to those charges, by judgment dated November 5, 1987,
petitioner was sentenced lo two aggregalc pri'son terms of eighteen years to I ifc, those·
sentences to run concurrently.
Petitioner first became eligible for discretionary parole in 2004 and appeared before
the Parole Board that year. Following a hearing, the Parole Board denied petitioner's parole
request and ordered him held for a period of twenty-four months, after which period, the
Parole Board would reconvene to reconsider his parole request.
Petitioner appeared before the Parole Board for a second time on May 8, 2006, and
again was denied parole; the Parole Board again ordered that parole would not be
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reconsidered for twenty-four months. It is this denial that petitioner seeks to vacate on the
grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious and violated his constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection of the law. Pe ti lio11cr further claims that the Parole Board was
improperly constituted.
The court first n.n-ns to that branch of petitioner's motion in which he contends that
the decision of the Parole Board denying him release on parole was arbitrary and capricious
and gave undue weight to the nature of the crime committed.
Parole release is a discretionaty function of the parole board and its dete1111ination
should not be disturbed by the court unless it is shown that the Board's dccis1011 is irrational
"bordering on impropriety" and that the determination was, thus arbitrmy and capricious (see
Matter ofSilmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000]; Marter ofKing v New York State Div.
ofParole, 190 AD2d 423 [ 1993]; Matter ofWeinstein vDennison, 7 Misc3cl 1009(a)[2005];
Matter of Coaxum v New York State Div. ofParole, 14 Misc 3d 661 [2006J). ln reviewing

tbe Board's decision, the comt must also examine whether the Board's discretion was
properly exercised in accordance with the Executive Law. Section 259-J [2][ c] of that statute
provides:
Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a
reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after. considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law.
3

The statute provides the Board with the .following specific factors to be considered
in determining whether the above general criteria has been met:

(I) the institutional record including program goals and
n(;l'O mpli8i 1mc11 ts, iH.:ad~m ic acl 1i c,·e1m.:11ls, vm;a timrn l educa11011,
training nr work assignments, lhcr:ipy and int erpersona l

relat ionsh ips with ~ tarrand inm11tcs; (i i) pcri'mmanc.:c, if any, as
a participant in a temporary release progrnni; (iii) release plans
int.:luding co mmunity rcsmircci-;, employm c11l, cducnlit>n nnd
training and support services nvailablc to the inrnnl e; (iv} a11y
dcponarion order issued by the feclern l government ... nnd (v)
the written statement
the t:rime victim or th e victim's
representative, where the cri me victim is deceased or is mentally
or physically incu paci ta led.

or

'·

(Executive Law§ 259-I (2) [c)).
Additionally, where, as here, the sentencing court has sci the minimum period of
incarceration, the Parole Board must also take into account:
(I) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the

type ofsentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the
sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney for the
inmate, the pre-sentence probation report as well as
consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and
activities following arrest and prior to confinement; and (ii)
prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern of
offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement (Executive Law §
259-1 [1] [a]; [2] ]c]).

Here, after a review of the record before the Parole Board, the court concludes that
the denial of petitioner's application was a result of the Parole Board's failure to weigh all
4

of the relevant statuto1y factors. Instead, the Parole Board focused almost entirely upon the
nature of petitioner's crime and, indeed, "there is a strong indication that the denial of
petitioner's application was a foregone conclusion" (Matter ofKing, I 90 AD2d at 431 -432).
The thirty-nine year-old petitioner stood
before .the Parole Board having already once
'
before been denied parole after serving the minimum sentence for the crime he had
committed 20 years earlier when he was 19 years of age. At the parole hearing, petitioner
admitted his guilt in the shooting, stating:
What I did was a cowardly act. At this point I don't tiy to take
that away. I can't express to you exactly what emotion I was
feeling on that day except for fear, but 1 know now it was a
cowardly act. It takes [more] bravery not to use violence than
to use violence.

When asked how he had changed since the day he had committed the
crime, petitioner stated:
I have thought about that over the years also, and basically I'd
like to think of myself as more mature. 1'm also sadder inside
because I have done something I can't take back. I have to live
with that, and some day I'm going to face my creator, and I'm
going to have to make accounts for what I did, and that's a day

I fear.
Petitioner also advised the Parole Board that he had obtained two degrees while
incarcerated - a bachelor's degree in business administration and an associate's degree in
small business management with a major in marketing.
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The record before the Parole Board included a letter dated February 4, 2004 which
was written by Robert Maboney, a retired lieutenant with the New York State Department
of Correctional Services \.Vho, since his retirement has worked as a volunteer at Arthur Kill
Correctional Facility, where pctitionehs an inmate. ln that letter Mahoney states that he met
petitioner, an ex-marine, some three years earlier when petitioner became a member of the
American Legion Post which Mahoney had founded in the prison in 1989. According to
Mahoney, petitioner is an active member of the post and has volunteered a great deal of his
time to working on a number of fundraiscrs. Further, states Mahoney, petitioner is the
coordinator of the family day events which are held each year at the prison and is both a tutor
and a counselor to inmates assigned to the "Special Needs Unit."
Mahoney states that ns petitioner's interest in providing services to inmates grew, he
became the Post's "service officer" and, in that capacity worked with his fellow veterans who
were preparing for release with housing needs, getting into community drug programs, and
with any other medical needs. Finally, Mahoney states that, in 2003, petitioner was elected
to Post's highest pos ition, that of Commander, and that he has been doing a good job at
keeping up the morale of the other members of tlie P ost. Mahoney expressed his belief that
petitioner has "accomplished [sic) a new meaning in his life" and that he would "be able to
carry this with him while leading a productive life."
Sergeants A. Jorge and D. Blankinship also submitted letters to the Parole Board
'

attesting to petitioner's positive adjustment to prison and his work with the veteran 's group.
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The parole file also reveals that petitioner has worked at the Department of Motor
Vehicles (Motor Vehicles) in Richmond County since 200 I through a work program set up
between the Depm1ment of Corrections and Motor Vehicles. In a letter a Mrs. Rodriguez,
who has supervised petitioner at Motor Vehicles since 2003, states that petitioner is
"extremely helpful and knowledgeable" about the procedures at Motor Vehicles. According
to Rodriguez, petitioner is a team leader whose responsibilities include teaching new
procedures to his fellow workers, and he "does so efficiently and thoroughly" and is
"extJemely cooperative and respectful." Janice Salvatore, also from Motor Vehicles, states
in her letter to the Parole Board that petitioner's "ability to interact respectively with a wide
range of people and personalities has often turned difficult situations into positive ones."
Salvatore concluded that petitioner's "excellent customer service skills and work efforts . .
. will surely [be an asset] in whatever position he might hold." Similarly applauding
petitioner's participation in the work program were written by Theodora Humphry and Ing1id
Nurse.
As the above recitation of parts of the record before the P arole Board demonstrates,

it appears that petitioner has used his time.in prison well and that almost all of the statutory
factors to be considered by the Parole Board in detennining whether parole should be granted
weigh in petitioner's favor. In light ofthis fact, the court would expect a rational explanation
by the Pa~ole Board for its decision as to why parole was nonetheless denied. Instead, the
Parole Board focused almost exclusively on the serious nature of petitioner's crime as a

7

reason its denial parole. Afte1 noting the bare facts of the crime, the decision states:
when we weigh the fac t that you took two lives against your
achievements, we believe release at this time is not in the public
interest.
I

...

\Vhile making a passing reference to his "clean disciplinary record and positive
progrnnunatic efforts," the Parole Board made clear that those factors no matter how
impressive, could not justify his release from prison when weighed against the seriousness

of his crime. Thus, "t]he passing mention in the Parole Board's decision of petitioner's
rehabilitative achievements cannot se1;re.tQ dem.onstrate that the Parole Board weighed or
fair ly considered the statuto1y factors·where, as het'e, it appears that such achievemetits 'were
mentioned only to dismiss 01em'

u1

' >
.
light of the seriousness of petitioner's crime (see Matter

· o.!i.)hiliips ·,; De11ni~oi1: JvLi, Oct. I 2, 2:066, at ~J, co1l;q11Bting Maller ofKir;g, 190 AD2d
at 434).

..

..

{n co';1tl1,1d,ing that tbc Parole Board's det~rmin~tion was arbitrary and capricious, the
.

, f'

• .•.

Court recognizes that it is not necessary for t~ri,·Parole Board, 'in its decision, to specifica1ly
f

-· '

refer to each and ~ve1y one of the statutory factoi·s it considered in its decision granting or
.

I

denying parole release (Matter o.f King, 190 AD2d at 431; see Matter of Davis v New York

State Div. Of Parole, 97 AD2d 412 [1985]; People ex rel. Harderxhanji v New York State
Bd. ofParole, 97 AD2d 3 68 [ 1983 ]), or afford those factors equal weight (see People ex rel.
Herbert v New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 AD2d 128, 133 [1983]). However, "it is
unquestionably the duty of the Parole Board to give fair consideration to each of the
8

applicable statutory factors as to every person who comes before it, and where the record
convincingly demonstrates that the Parole Board did in fact fail to consider the proper
standards, the courts must intervene" (Matter of Killg, 190 AD2d at 43 l ).
Here, the Parole Board, in essence, revealed in its decision its belief that the sentence
~

which: petitioner roceivep', which provided him with the possibility of parole, was
inappropriate. [n so doing the Parole Board exceeded its powers; it is the role of the
legislature to determine the appropriate sentences for particular crimes, and of the judiciary
to detennine the appropriate sentence for the particular defendant before the court.
Indeed, in focusing exclusively on the petitioner's crime as a reason for denying
parole the Parole Board was, in effect, re-sentencing petitioner to a sentence that excluded
any possibility of parole si nee petitioner is powerless tQ chang~ hi.,s ViSt conduct. And, as the
Appellate Division has admonished, under similar circumstances, such "re-sentencing" by
the P~role Board "rcvcal[s] a fundamental misunderstanding of the ,limitations of
administrative power" (Matter of King, 190 AD2d at 432).
This court, of course, does not meun to minimize the seriousness oJ petitioner's
'offense, nor the tragedy of the death of petitioner's victims, however in; affording the
possibility of parole to those convicted of murder, the legislature has made a determination
that, despite the seriousness of that crime, rehabilitation is -possible and desirable. fn this
vein, the Appellate Division stated in Matter ofKing, supra:
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Certainly every murder conviction is inherently a matter of the
utmost seriousness since it reflects the unjustifiable taking and
tragic loss of a humau life .. Since, however, the Legislature has
determined that a murder conviction per se should not preclude
parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating
circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the Clime itself

(Matter of King, J90 AD2d at 433).
ln short, the court concludes that the Parole Board, in effect, abdicated its
responsibility to fairly consider all the relevant statutory factors in determining whether
parole should be granted to petitioner and its resulting decision was arbitrary an.cl capricious.
The court rejects the petitioner's remaining contentions, including that the Parole
Board violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the law and that the Parole
Board 1vvas improperly constituted.
Accordingly, the court grants the petition, annuls respondent's decision denying
petitioner's release to parole supervision, and remands pelitioner's request for parole to
respondent, which, within 30 days of the service of a copy of this order with notice of entry,
shall hold a new hearing before a different panel. That panel shall consider the statutorily
required factors, as well as the sentencing minutes from petitioner's murder conviction.
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Within 14 days after the hearing respondent shall issue a decision, in non-conclusory

terms, on the appropriateness of petitioner's release to parole supervision.
The foregoing constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the court.

HON. MARK'· PAR1'Now
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